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Visual perceptionAmbiguous ﬁgures reverse their appearance during prolonged viewing and can be perceived in two (or
more) available interpretations. Both physical stimulus manipulations and cognitive control inﬂuence
the perception of ambiguous ﬁgures, but the underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In the
current study, the perception of an ambiguous ﬁgure was manipulated by adaptation to unambiguous
ﬁgures and/or placing the ambiguous ﬁgure into a context of unambiguous ﬁgures. Our results indicate
that both adaptation and context can effectively modulate perception of the ambiguous ﬁgure. When
manipulated together, adaptation and context processes showed additive effects upon the perception
of the ambiguous ﬁgure implying the independent mechanisms. Thus, top-down and bottom-up pro-
cesses seem to inﬂuence the perception of the ambiguous ﬁgures independently and neither seems to
be uniquely responsible for the generation of perceptual changes.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Visual perception is a dynamic brain function modulated by
both bottom-up and top-down processes. Although sensory input
changes constantly and often may even be ambiguous, humans
usually perceive their environment as clear and stable. The visual
system uses several strategies to accomplish this: visual cues and
features are organised, categorised, and grouped in order to create
an accurate representation of the world. However, in the case of
ambiguous ﬁgures (e.g., Necker cube) the visual system fails to pro-
vide us with a deﬁnite answer. In that case perception constantly
switches between two (or more) alternative perceptual interpreta-
tions. Explanations proposed for the bistability of ambiguous ﬁg-
ures tend to fall into two categories, emphasising the operation
of either bottom-up or top-down perceptual processes (for a re-
view, see Long & Toppino, 2004). The bottom-up based theories
suggest that perceptual reversals are the result of adaptation pro-
cesses occurring in competing neural channels in early visual areas
where reversals occur via cycles of adaptation, recovery, and mu-
tual inhibition (e.g., Orbach, Ehrlich, & Heath, 1963; Toppino &
Long, 1987). The cognitive theories suggest that reversals are
caused by feedback operations from central mechanisms to lowerlevel sensory activities, for example, by activation of a high-level
‘‘exploratory’’ mechanism that directs selective attention in a
way that forces lower-level perceptual systems to periodically ‘‘re-
fresh’’ (e.g., Leopold & Logothetis, 1999). Although most of the
authors suggested either a bottom-up or a top-down based expla-
nation, an increasing number of studies indicate that both types of
perceptual processes are important in the perception of ambiguous
images (Hochberg & Peterson, 1987; Kornmeier & Bach, 2012;
Leopold & Logothetis, 1999; Long & Toppino, 2004; Long, Toppino,
& Kostenbauder, 1983).
The adaptation effect is commonly classiﬁed as depending on
sensory processes. In the studies testing the adaptation effect
participants are presented with an unambiguous stimulus repre-
senting one of the possible interpretations of a subsequently
presented ambiguous ﬁgure. Typically, after prolonged (i.e., from
60 to 150 s) inspection of one of the unambiguous versions,
the adaptation effect is obtained, that is participants initially report
the alternative interpretation of the presented ambiguous ﬁgure
(Long & Moran, 2007; Long & Olszweski, 1999; Long, Stewart, &
Glancey, 2002; Long, Toppino, & Mondin, 1992; Orbach, Ehrlich,
& Heath, 1963; Toppino & Long, 1987; von Grünau, Wiggin, & Reed,
1984). Such results are usually explained in the framework of
neural adaptation: the neural channels underlying the percept that
is compatible to the unambiguous version get saturated; therefore,
an alternative version of the ambiguous ﬁgure becomes dominant
through reversal. In line with this view, recent research shows that
M. Intaite˙ et al. / Vision Research 89 (2013) 24–31 25adaptation is highly localised. In order to obtain the adaptation ef-
fect, adapting and testing stimuli have to be presented at the same
retinal location and match in size (Long & Moran, 2007). The adap-
tation effect is known to be transient and it is possible to signiﬁ-
cantly reduce it by prolonging the delay period between adapting
and test stimuli to approximately 10 s (Long & Moran, 2007). If
any of these conditions is modiﬁed (i.e., the unambiguous adapting
stimulus is viewed for a period shorter than 60 s, adapting and
test stimuli are presented at different spatial locations, or the delay
between the stimuli isP10 s), then a priming effect is obtained. In
that case, the ambiguous ﬁgure is initially perceived in the same
interpretation as the previously presented unambiguous adapting
stimulus (Long & Moran, 2007; Long & Olszweski, 1999; Long,
Toppino, & Mondin, 1992).
However, there is increasing evidence for the impact of top-
down processes on perceptual effects that cannot be readily
ascribed to passive and automatic processes such as adaptation
(Girgus, Rock, & Egatz, 1977; Strüber & Stadler, 1999). An example
for such a top-down process is the context effect. Contextual cues
may inﬂuence perceptual organisation of the presented ambiguous
ﬁgure by making its ﬁrst perceived interpretation compatible with
the contextual bias (Bruner & Minturn, 1955; Goolkasian, 1987).
Top-down modulation of ambiguous ﬁgures was previously
examined mostly in the framework of temporal context when the
presentation of the ambiguous ﬁgure was preceded with: (1) seg-
ments of the ambiguous test ﬁgure (Chastain & Burnham, 1975),
(2) images that were categorically related to the ambiguous test
ﬁgure (Bruner & Minturn, 1955; Bugelski & Alampay, 1961), or
(3) a ﬁgure biasing the participant to the one or the other possible
interpretation (Goolkasian, 1987), in order to ﬁnd out to what ex-
tent the effect of context determines the observer’s ﬁrst interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous ﬁgure. Compared to the adaptation paradigm
when a pre-test stimulus is usually presented for several minutes,
the pre-test stimulus duration in the temporal context paradigm is
much shorter, namely up to one minute. Regarding spatial context
manipulations, Wallace (1988) showed that once the Necker cube
is presented in a context consisting of geometric ﬁgures (i.e.,
squares, triangles, crosses, or parallelograms) the reported rate of
reversals is slower than that obtained in response to a single cube
viewing condition.
Previous research revealed that the adaptation effect is highly
susceptible to physical and temporal manipulations of stimuli
(Long & Moran, 2007; Long & Olszweski, 1999; Long & Toppino,
1994; Long, Stewart, & Glancey, 2002; Toppino & Long, 1987;
von Grünau, Wiggin, & Reed, 1984), but to our knowledge there
are no studies examining the possible interrelations of top-down
manipulations and the bottom-up adaptation effect. Hence, it is
not clear whether the effects of adaptation and context would be
related in an additive manner that is, suggesting independent
mechanisms, or would reduce each other depending on the exper-
imental condition.
In the present study, we developed a paradigm, which allowed
us to investigate both adaptation and context effects. Participants
were adapted to an unambiguous squares stimulus in either
‘downwards’ or ‘upwards’ orientation that preceded the ambigu-
ous squares stimulus. Top-down modulation of the perception of
the ambiguous squares stimulus was manipulated by presenting
the ambiguous squares stimulus in the context of four surrounding
identical unambiguous squares stimuli. Adaptation and context ef-
fects were tested either separately or within the same trials. In the
latter case, the orientation of the context stimuli either matched
the previously presented adapting stimulus or not, resulting in
overall four conditions: an adaptation condition, a context condi-
tion, an adaptation different from context condition, and an adap-
tation identical to context condition. We expected the typical
adaptation effect in the adaptation condition and the context effectin the context condition. Furthermore, we hypothesised that the
context effect would be additive to the adaptation effect when
both are combined. In particular, in the adaptation different from
context condition, in which the orientations of the adapting and
context stimuli did not match, the adaptation and context manip-
ulations should both independently affect perception which should
be demonstrated by the additivity of both effects (i.e., context
should add to the strength of the adaptation effect). Predictions
with respect to whether the adaptation or the context effect would
exert a stronger inﬂuence on perception of ambiguous ﬁgures if
tested in competition (in the adaptation identical to context condi-
tion) are not possible to make on the basis of current knowledge. If
the adaptation effect would be stronger, then the perceptual out-
come would resemble the adaptation effect, whereas if context
would be stronger, then the perceptual outcome would be similar
to the context effect.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
A total of 70 participants took part in the present study. Eight
participants were excluded from analyses: ﬁve because of an
inability to report reversals (in spite of being able to see both inter-
pretations of the ambiguous squares stimulus during the practice
period), two for providing erroneous responses (i.e., repeatedly
reporting the same percept of the ambiguous stimulus instead of
perceptual changes) and one because he did not follow the instruc-
tions. Thus, the data of 62 healthy participants (twenty males;
mean age = 21.45 years, SD = 2.22) were entered into the analyses.
Fifty eight participants were right-handed (Oldﬁeld, 1971). Each
participant had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and had no
prior experience with psychophysical testing. They were com-
pletely naïve to the hypotheses and goals of the study and received
credit toward partial fulﬁlment of the requirements of their study
programmes. Informed consent was obtained from all participants
and the study was formally approved by the Lithuanian Bioethics
Committee.
2.2. Design and procedure
An ambiguous, two-dimensional drawing of a Necker cube-like
ﬁgure composed of ﬁve overlapping squares was chosen as the
main experimental stimulus. This ﬁgure had previously been used
in other studies (Long, Toppino, & Mondin, 1992; von Grünau,
Wiggin, & Reed, 1984), and it was named ‘the overlapping squares’
by Long, Toppino, and Mondin (1992). During the experiment the
participants were presented in each trial with a 120 s adaptation
period followed by a blank screen presented for 1 s. Subsequently,
participants were presented with an ambiguous squares stimulus
(in the four different conditions described below) for 30 s and
had to respond to the perceived changes of the square’s orientation
by pressing one of the two keys (upwards or downwards) on the
response box. Each trial was followed by an intertrial interval of
120 s. The four conditions were randomly presented and had the
following characteristics (see Fig. 1):
(1) The adaptation condition (hereafter AC) replicated a stan-
dard adaptation paradigm – an unambiguous squares
stimulus oriented either ‘downwards’ or ‘upwards’ was pre-
sented in the adaptation period followed by an ambiguous
squares stimulus during the test period (Fig. 1A).
(2) The context condition (hereafter CC) examined the effect of a
spatial context on the perception of the ambiguous squares
stimulus. A ﬁxation point was presented during the
Duration of a single trial (151-sec)
Test period (30-sec)Adaptation period(120-sec)
A
B
D
C
ISI (1-sec) ITI (120-sec)
Fig. 1. An illustration of an experimental trial in all four conditions: (A) the ‘Adaptation Condition’ (AC), (B) the ‘Context Condition’ (CC), (C) the ‘Adaptation Different from
Context’ condition (ADC), and (D) the ‘Adaptation Identical to Context’ condition (AIC).
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on it in order to equalise this condition to the other experi-
mental conditions. During the test period participants were
presented with an ambiguous squares stimulus in the con-
text of surrounding unambiguous squares stimuli in either
‘downwards’ or ‘upwards’ orientation (Fig. 1B).
(3) In the adaptation different from context (hereafter ADC)
condition an unambiguous squares stimulus oriented either
‘downwards’ or ‘upwards’ was presented in the adaptation
period followed by an ambiguous squares stimulus in the
context of surrounding unambiguous squares stimuli in
either ‘upwards’ or ‘downwards’ orientation, respectively(Fig. 1C); thus in this condition the orientation of the adap-
tation stimulus was different from the orientation of the
context stimuli.
(4) In the adaptation identical to context (hereafter AIC) condi-
tion an unambiguous squares stimulus oriented either
‘downwards’ or ‘upwards’ was presented in the adaptation
period followed by an ambiguous squares stimulus in the
context of surrounding unambiguous squares stimuli in
either ‘downwards’ or ‘upwards’ orientation, respectively
(Fig. 1D); thus, in this condition the orientation of the adap-
tation stimulus was the same as the orientation of the con-
text stimuli.
M. Intaite˙ et al. / Vision Research 89 (2013) 24–31 27All stimuli were drawn in black, presented on a white back-
ground and viewed binocularly. A single ﬁgure subtended a visual
angle of 1.72  1.64 and the entire display consisting of ambigu-
ous squares in the context of unambiguous squares subtended a
visual angle of 6.03  5.87. The ﬁxation point subtended a visual
angle of 0.04. Stimuli were presented on a 21 in computer screen
with a frame rate of 85 Hz at a viewing distance of 70 cm. The
position of the ﬁxation point on the unambiguous squares was
adjusted to match the centre of the subsequently presented
ambiguous squares. During the experiment the participants were
asked to keep their eyes focused on the central ﬁxation point.
Each participant took part in a 90 min individual testing session.
Before testing commenced, the ambiguous squares stimulus was
shown to each participant, and they were instructed to watch it
until reversals were perceived.
In the beginning of the session, each participant performed two
practice trials (the AC and the CC conditions) in order to get
acquainted with the task requirements. After the practice trials,
and before the beginning of the experiment, participants were
given a 2 min rest so that any potential adaptation or contextual
effects from the practice session would have attenuated.
During the experiment every participant in each experimental
condition viewed the ambiguous squares stimulus twice after each
of the ‘downwards’ and the ‘upwards’ unambiguous squares stim-
ulus. Thus, each of the four conditions consisted of four trials, and
every participant completed 16 experimental trials in total. The
experiment was divided into two blocks, which were separated
by a 5 min break. Each block contained two trials (one of each
unambiguous orientation) from every experimental condition pre-
sented in a random order. Adaptation and test stimuli were pre-
sented at the same spatial location in the centre of the screen.
The participants were instructed to let the perceptual reversals
to occur naturally and were asked not to manipulate their percep-
tions intentionally. No feedback on performance was given.
Dependent measures used in the analyses were the ﬁrst re-
sponse regarding the percept of the orientation of the ambiguous
squares stimulus (hereafter Orientation First Percept), the reaction
time to the ﬁrst reversal (hereafter RT First Reversal) and the aver-
age durations of ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’ percepts during the
30-s test period (hereafter Perceptual Durations). Concerning the
analysis of Orientation First Percept, the initial interpretations
were coded in terms of whether the ambiguous squares stimulus
was perceived in the predicted (score = 1) or unpredicted
(score = 0) orientation with respect to the experimental hypothe-
ses. For the AC condition (Fig. 1A), the ambiguous squares stimulus
was predicted to be perceived in the opposite orientation
(score = 1) to the unambiguous squares stimulus viewed in the
adaptation period. This prediction was based on the known effect
of adaptation, which shows that participants, after prolonged
(i.e., from 60 to 150 s) viewing of one of the unambiguous ver-
sions, more frequently report the alternative version of the subse-
quently presented ambiguous ﬁgure (Long & Moran, 2007; Long &
Olszweski, 1999; Long, Toppino, & Mondin, 1992; Long, Stewart, &
Glancey, 2002; von Grünau, Wiggin, & Reed, 1984).
For the CC condition (Fig. 1B), the reported ﬁrst orientation of
the ambiguous squares stimulus was predicted to match
(score = 1) the orientation of the context stimuli it was presented
in. This prediction was based on the effect of context, which showsTable 1
Means (SD) of orientation ﬁrst percept and RTs to ﬁrst reversal in all experimental condit
Adaptation condition (AC) Context condition (CC) A
Orientation ﬁrst percept 0.60 (0.21) 0.80 (0.27) 0
RT ﬁrst reversal 5.93 (3.46) 4.90 (3.30) 8that participants, after viewing the cues in the context of the
ambiguous test ﬁgure, more frequently report the cue-compatible
ﬁrst orientation of the subsequently presented ambiguous ﬁgure
(Bruner & Minturn, 1955; Bugelski & Alampay, 1961; Chastain &
Burnham, 1975; Goolkasian, 1987).
In the ADC condition (Fig. 1C) the orientation of the unambigu-
ous squares stimulus presented during the adaptation period did
not match the orientations of subsequently presented unambigu-
ous context stimuli. Therefore, it was predicted that the ambiguous
squares stimulus will be perceived in the opposite orientation
(score = 1) to the unambiguous squares stimulus viewed in the
adaptation period and in the same orientation as the unambiguous
context stimuli.
In the AIC condition (Fig. 1D) the orientation of the unambigu-
ous squares stimulus presented during the adaptation period
matched the orientations of subsequently presented unambiguous
context stimuli, thereby creating a competition between adapta-
tion and context effects. As discussed in the Introduction, we did
not have a speciﬁc prediction with respect to dominance of either
the adaptation or the context effect (i.e., whether the adaptation or
the context effect would exert a stronger inﬂuence on the percep-
tion of the ambiguous squares stimulus). Therefore, the prediction
for the AIC condition was derived after analyses of the AC and the
CC data (see Results section), that is, the ambiguous squares stim-
ulus was predicted to be perceived in the same (score = 1) orienta-
tion as the unambiguous context stimuli and the unambiguous
squares stimulus viewed in the adaptation period (i.e., dominance
of context effect).
The unpredicted directions for all the conditions (score = 0)
were as follows: the same orientation as that of the unambiguous
squares stimulus viewed in the adaptation period for the AC and
the ADC conditions and the opposite orientation to that of unam-
biguous context stimuli for the CC and AIC conditions.
For the Orientation First Percept and RT First Reversal data, the
responses provided for ‘downwards’ and ‘upwards’ orientations
were averaged together, because we coded the responses with re-
spect to the predictions for the ambiguous squares stimulus to be
perceived either in the same, or in the opposite orientation as the
unambiguous squares stimulus presented in the AC condition (or
as the unambiguous context stimuli in the CC condition). An aver-
age Orientation First Percept score was derived individually for
each participant in each experimental condition and it could range
from 0 to 1 (i.e., 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, or 1).
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests revealed that RT First Reversal and
Perceptual Durations did not meet the condition of normality.
The distribution of raw scores of RT First Percept and Perceptual
Durations were leptokurtic and positively skewed. Square root
transformations were applied to RT First Percept data and lognor-
mal transformations were applied to data of Perceptual Durations
(Howell, 2009). Additionally, one sample t tests (effect size: Co-
hen’s d) were conducted on the Orientation First Percept data in or-
der to determine whether the mean values of all the experimental
conditions were obtained by chance or whether real adaptation
and context effects were obtained. Separate repeated measures
ANOVAs with one within-participant factor of Condition (AC, CC,
ADC, AIC) were conducted on Orientation First percept and RT First
Reversal (Table 1). Repeated measures ANOVA with three within-
participant factors of Condition (AC, CC, ADC, AIC), Perceptualions.
daptation different from Context (ADC) Adaptation identical to context (AIC)
.91 (0.24) 0.70 (0.33)
.18 (4.32) 4.49 (3.02)
28 M. Intaite˙ et al. / Vision Research 89 (2013) 24–31response (downwards, upwards) and Adapting (or context) stimu-
lus (downwards, upwards) were conducted on the data of percep-
tual durations. One-way ANOVAs (Bonferroni–Holm corrected
according to Holm, 1979) were used for post-hoc pairwise compar-
ison of conditions in the case of a main effect of Condition. In all
cases of signiﬁcant violations of sphericity, Huynh-Feldt correc-
tions were applied to the analyses of repeated measures.3. Results
3.1. Orientation ﬁrst percept
One sample t tests indicated that the mean values of all the
experimental conditions were signiﬁcantly different from random
responding (i.e., 0.5): AC t(61) = 3.56, p < .002, d = .45, CC
t(61) = 8.79, p < .001, d = 1.11, ADC t(61) = 13.57, p < .001,
d = 1.72, and AIC t(61) = 4.78, p < .001, d = .61 (see Table 1).
The repeated measures ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant effect of
Condition F(3,183) = 22.03, p < .001, g2p = .27. Comparing the AC
and CC conditions in order to check which of these two conditions
had a stronger inﬂuence on the ﬁrst ambiguous squares ﬁgure per-
cept, revealed that the manipulation of context (M = 0.80;
SD = 0.27) was stronger than that of adaptation (M = 0.60;
SD = 0.21), F(1,61) = 19.27, p < .001, g2p = .24 (Fig. 2). In addition,
more participants had a stronger Orientation First Percept effect
in the context condition (39 participants) than in the adaptation0
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Fig. 2. Number of times that participants ﬁrst reported the ‘predicted’ orientation
of the ambiguous squares stimulus according to the orientation of the unambiguous
squares stimulus (‘upwards’ or ‘downwards’) viewed in the preceding adaptation
period or that viewed in the subsequent context period (in the CC) (p 6 .01). Error
bars represent standard deviations (SD) above and below the mean. The dashed line
represents the performance at chance level.condition (13 participants). Based on these ﬁndings we predicted
that context should be dominant over adaptation with respect to
the ﬁrst percept in the AIC condition. Therefore, the orientation
of ﬁrst percept of the ambiguous squares stimulus in the AIC con-
dition should be equivalent to the previously viewed adapting
stimulus and the context stimuli.
Further we only compared conditions that had the same pre-
dicted orientations of responses; that is we compared the AC with
the ADC (opposite ﬁrst interpretation of ambiguous squares stim-
ulus with respect to adapting stimulus) and the CC with the AIC
(the same ﬁrst interpretation of the ambiguous squares stimulus
with respect to the context stimuli).
In addition, we anticipated the additivity of adaptation and con-
text effects in the ADC and AIC conditions and calculated difference
values: ﬁrst percept responses minus random responding (i.e., 0.5):
AC (0.6  0.5 = 0.1), CC (0.80  0.5 = 0.30), ADC (0.91  0.5 = 0.41),
and AIC (0.70  0.5 = 0.20). These difference values were termed
dAC, dCC, dADC, and dAIC, respectively. Assuming additivity of
adaptation and context effects, it was predicted that the value of
dADC should be roughly equal to the sum of dAC and dCC (i.e.,
0.1 + 0.30 = 0.40). Regarding the AIC condition, we expected that
context will be stronger than adaptation, that is, dAIC should be
roughly equal to the subtraction of dAC from dCC (i.e.,
0.30  0.1 = 0.20) (Fig. 3).
The AC and the ADC conditions were compared to ﬁnd out
whether the introduction of the context stimulus of the opposite
interpretation with respect to the previously presented adapting
stimulus had any effect on the choice of the ﬁrst percept of the
ambiguous squares stimulus. A signiﬁcant effect of Condition
F(1,61) = 69.97, p < .001, g2p = .53, showed that when the orienta-
tions of the adapting and the context stimuli did not match, the
overall effect was higher than the adaptation effect, and the partic-
ipants reported more adapting stimulus incompatible ﬁrst inter-
pretations than in response to the adaptation condition.
Moreover, the results suggest the additivity of adaptation and con-
text effects as reﬂected in the value obtained in the ADC condition
(0.41) which was only slightly higher than the predicted value in
this condition (0.40).
The CC and the AIC conditions were compared with the aim of
ﬁnding out whether the introduction of the context stimulus in
the same orientation as the previously presented adapting stimu-
lus had any effect on the choice of the ﬁrst percept of the ambigu-
ous squares stimulus. A signiﬁcant effect of Condition
F(1,61) = 9.99, p < .003, g2p = .14, showed that when the orienta-
tions of adapting and context stimuli matched, the overall effect
was lower than the context effect. In addition, the difference value
obtained in the AIC condition (0.20) was equal to the predicted va-
lue of this condition (0.20), once again conﬁrming the additive
interaction between the context and adaptation effects.0
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Fig. 4. Average reaction times to the ﬁrst reversal of the ambiguous squares
stimulus in all conditions (p 6 .01). Error bars represent SD above and below the
mean.
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The repeated measures ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant effect of
Condition F(3,183) = 24.33, p < .001, g2p = .29. Further analyses
showed that the RT in response to the ﬁrst reversal was signiﬁ-
cantly longer in ADC compared to AC F(1,61) = 15.25, p < .001,
g2p = .20, to CC F(1,61) = 48.98, p < .001, g2p = .45, and to AIC
F(1,61) = 53.39, p < .001, g2p = .47 (Fig. 4). In addition, the RT in re-
sponse to AC was signiﬁcantly longer than that in response to the
AIC condition F(1,61) = 11.60, p < .002, g2p = .16.
There were no other signiﬁcant differences between conditions
(largest F = 6.63).
3.3. Perceptual durations
The repeated measures ANOVA (Condition  Perceptual
response  Adapting stimulus) revealed signiﬁcant effects of Con-
dition F(3,183) = 12.28, p < .001, g2p = .17 and Perceptual response
F(1,61) = 18.66, p < .001, g2p = .23. Signiﬁcant Perceptual
response  Adapting stimulus F(1,61) = 36.00, p < .001, g2p = .37
and Condition  Perceptual response  Adapting stimulus
F(3,183) = 28.10, p < .001, g2p = .32 interactions were also obtained.
Further analyses, conducted on each condition separately, revealed
signiﬁcant Perceptual response  Adapting stimulus interactions
only in the AC F(1,61) = 40.49, p < .001, g2p = .40, the CC
F(1,61) = 17.96, p < .001, g2p = .23, and the ADC F(1,61) = 43.79,
p < .001, g2p = .42 conditions.
Signiﬁcant effects of the Adapting stimulus were obtained in the
AC and the ADC conditions: when participants were adapted to the
‘downwards’ F(1,61) = 11.09, p < .002, g2p = .15 (the ADC:
F(1,61) = 17.56, p < .001, g2p = .22) or the ‘upwards’
F(1,61) = 19.72, p < .001, g2p = .24 (the ADC: F(1,61) = 42.00,
p < .001, g2p = .41) unambiguous squares stimulus, they perceived
the ambiguous test stimulus in the opposite interpretation with re-
spect to the adapting stimulus for signiﬁcantly longer durations. In
the context condition, only when participants were viewing the
ambiguous test stimulus in the context of ‘downwards’ unambigu-
ous stimuli F(1,61) = 24.79, p < .001, g2p = .29, they tended to per-
ceive the ambiguous test stimulus in ‘downwards’ orientation for
signiﬁcantly longer durations.
4. Discussion
The aim of the current study was to examine the impact of spa-
tial context on the perception of ambiguous squares stimuli after
the participants were adapted to an unambiguous stimulus, repre-
senting one of the two available orientations of the ambiguoussquares stimulus. Previous ﬁndings of adaptation (Long & Moran,
2007; Long & Olszweski, 1999; Long, Toppino, & Mondin, 1992;
Long, Stewart, & Glancey, 2002; Orbach, Ehrlich, & Heath, 1963;
Toppino & Long, 1987; von Grünau, Wiggin, & Reed, 1984) were
replicated in our study and spatial context effects on the percep-
tion of an ambiguous ﬁgure were obtained (Bruner & Minturn,
1955; Bugelski & Alampay, 1961; Wallace, 1988). The adaptation
effect was found in the AC condition and it was weaker than a con-
text effect obtained in the CC condition. This result suggests that
global top-down processes responsible for the context effect might
have a stronger inﬂuence on the perception of ambiguous ﬁgures
than the localised neural channels causing the adaptation effect
(Long & Moran, 2007). The effects of adaptation and context on
the perception of ambiguous squares stimulus were further sup-
ported by RT First Reversal data. It is known that after a few min-
utes’ adaptation participants tend to perceive less perceptual
reversals in comparison to priming or neutral viewing conditions
(Long & Moran, 2007; Long & Olszweski, 1999; Long, Toppino, &
Mondin, 1992), therefore, we expected longer RTs in the AC and
ADC conditions where adaptation effect was estimated to be stron-
ger. In the ADC condition, the sum of adaptation and context ef-
fects was obtained, as participants needed signiﬁcantly more
time to perceive a subsequent reversal of ambiguous squares stim-
ulus in comparison to other experimental conditions. In addition,
the RT to First Reversal was longer in response to the AC than in
the AIC condition, revealing that adapting ﬁgure compatible con-
text contributed to the decrease of the overall effect. This result
supported the high susceptibility of adaptation to physical and
temporal manipulations of stimuli (Long & Moran, 2007; Long &
Olszweski, 1999; Long, Toppino, & Mondin, 1992). The RTs ob-
tained in response to the CC and the AIC conditions had similar
durations (see Table 1). This gives further support to the conclusion
that the adapting ﬁgure incompatible context was stronger than
the adaptation effect. To sum up, both adaptation and context ef-
fects inﬂuenced the initial percept of the ambiguous ﬁgure in an
additive manner in the ADC and AIC conditions. These ﬁndings
indicate that both bottom-up factors and top-down factors can
inﬂuence perception concurrently.
The results add to converging evidence of additivity of top-
down and bottom-up processes operating in the human visual sys-
tem (Kornmeier, Hein, & Bach, 2009; Long & Moran, 2007; Long &
Toppino, 2004; Toppino, 2003). The perception of the ambiguous
squares stimulus was modulated by both the adaptation effect
and the subsequently presented context. In particular, the adapta-
tion and context stimuli inﬂuence the perception to similar de-
grees in the conditions ADC and AIC as in the conditions AC and
CC. It is also important to note that all the prerequisites necessary
to obtain the adaptation effect were used in our study, that is, the
adaptation period was sufﬁciently long, the adapting and test stim-
uli had the same retinal location, the delay between adapting and
test stimuli lasted only one second (Long & Moran, 2007), and
within all trials the participants were instructed to keep their eyes
focused on the central ﬁxation point (Long & Olszweski, 1999; von
Grünau, Wiggin, & Reed, 1984).
It has been speculated that the adaptation process occurs in
early visual areas where visual inputs are organised retinotopically
(Orbach, Ehrlich, & Heath, 1963; Toppino & Long, 1987); therefore,
the effects of spatial context on the ﬁrst reported percept in the CC,
AIC and ADC conditions cannot be explained by neural adaptation.
The cognitive theory is also insufﬁcient for the explanation of cur-
rent results as according to this theory the adaptation effect, which
was revealed in the AC, ADC and AIC conditions should not have
been obtained even if unambiguous (or biasing) ﬁgures preceded
the ambiguous test ﬁgure for a period of 2 (or more) minutes.
Several theories tried to reconcile the on-going debate regard-
ing the function of bottom-up versus top-down processes in
30 M. Intaite˙ et al. / Vision Research 89 (2013) 24–31ambiguous ﬁgure perception (Hochberg & Peterson, 1987;
Kornmeier & Bach, 2012; Leopold & Logothetis, 1999; Long &
Toppino, 2004; Long, Toppino, & Kostenbauder, 1983). Visual
bistability as a result of changes in the attractor states of a neural
network has been extensively studied to explain the phenomenon
of binocular rivalry (Lehky, 1988; Noest et al., 2007; Wilson, 2003).
Kornmeier and Bach (2012) proposed an integrative theory accord-
ing to which representations of objects in the brain are modelled as
attractors (i.e., each perceived state that can be occupied by a
physical stimulus) and their depth is a measure of the current
representation’s stability. Usually, when we view an image there
is only one attractor to perceive (stable perception), but with
ambiguous stimuli there are at least two. The authors assume that
during prolonged observation of an ambiguous stimulus (i.e., for
several minutes) a transiently stable percept gets destabilised
(i.e., it changes from one available percept to the other) in a slow
and constant manner. Once the percept gets ‘destabilised’, a fast
restabilisation (disambiguation) occurs resulting in an alternative
percept of the ambiguous stimulus. Kornmeier and Bach (2012)
hypothesised that adaptation causes a slow reduction in the depth
of the attractor (due to the impact of the adapting stimulus) and, as
a result, participants tend to perceive the alternative orientation of
the subsequently presented ambiguous ﬁgure. In addition, the
integrative theory is supported by an electroencephalographic
study exploring the perception of intermittently presented ambig-
uous ﬁgures (Intaite˙, Koivisto, & Revonsuo, 2013), which revealed
that the event-related potentials induced by the perceptual
changes may be interpreted within the framework of destabiliza-
tion and restabilisation processes.
The results of the current study are in accordance with the inte-
grative theory. The adaptation effect was obtained, which is known
to have an effect on the destabilisation process (Kornmeier & Bach,
2012). Due to adaptation, the destabilisation process reached a
point of maximal instability and the perceptual system tried to de-
tect a ‘more stable’ state as fast as possible (Kornmeier & Bach,
2012). Therefore, once a context (which did not match the adapting
stimulus) was presented together with an ambiguous squares
stimulus in the ADC condition, the overall effect of experimental
manipulation was stronger than in the AC or CC conditions, sug-
gesting that the context manipulation combined with the adapta-
tion enhanced the destabilisation in response to the ﬁrst
reported percept: the ambiguous squares stimulus was perceived
in the opposite orientation with respect to the unambiguous
adapting stimulus even more often than in the AC condition. The
adaptation effects were mimicked by data of perceptual durations:
the participants continued to perceive the adapting stimulus
incompatible orientation of the ambiguous squares stimulus for
signiﬁcantly longer time in both the AC and ADC conditions.
However, when the ambiguous stimulus was presented in the
context matching the preceding adapting stimulus (the AIC condi-
tion) the context not only overruled the adaptation effect, but as
well equalised perceptual durations. This result supports the pre-
mise of the different operational time scales in destabilisation
and restabilisation (Kornmeier & Bach, 2012): the destabilisation
process again reached its point of instability (due to adaptation),
but as the orientation of the contextual stimuli matched the orien-
tation of the adapting stimulus, the destabilisation was interrupted
by restabilisation and a context-matching ﬁrst percept of the
ambiguous squares stimulus was preferred. It could be speculated
that even though the attractor was ﬂattened through adaptation,
the context broadened the attractor towards the alternative per-
cept and thus made the context-compatible orientation available
for perception.
One of the reviewers pointed out that our adapting stimuli
might be slightly ambiguous, limiting the study design. However,
as the results of our experiment, and experiments of otherresearchers using the same stimuli (Long & Olszweski, 1999; Long,
Toppino, & Mondin, 1992; von Grünau, Wiggin, & Reed, 1984) were
comparable to the results obtained with other ambiguous stimuli
(Long & Batterman, 2012; Long & Moran, 2007; Long & Olszweski,
1999; Long, Toppino, & Mondin, 1992) and due to the fact that par-
ticipants may not be able to understand the possible ambiguity of
the stimuli if they are not informed about it (Girgus, Rock, & Egatz,
1977; Rock, Hall, & Davis, 1994; Rock & Mitchener, 1992), we con-
clude that it was not a major issue in this experimental study.
However, we strongly agree that in future studies additional
screening of the participants (and the data obtained) with an aim
to avoid this problem is highly recommended.
In summary, an adaptation to unambiguous versions of the
ambiguous ﬁgure prior to the inspection of the ambiguous squares
ﬁgure produced localised adaptation (i.e., bottom-up) effects,
whereas positioning the ambiguous squares ﬁgure in a context
produced a context (i.e., top-down) effect. Moreover, when inﬂu-
ences of adaptation and context were tested against each other,
the additivity of adaptation and context effects was shown with
the context effect exerting a stronger inﬂuence on perceptual
outcome than the adaptation effect. We suggest, in line with
Kornmeier and Bach (2012) that a mechanism based on the
operation of destabilisation and restabilisation processes might
be responsible for perceptual reversals.Acknowledgments
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